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The Economic Cost of the American Civil 'War: 
Estimates and Implications 
We are right to see  power, prestige, and confidence as  conditioned by  the 
Civil War. But it is a very easy step to regard the War, therefore, as a jolly 
piece of  luck only slightly disguised, part of  our divinely instituted success 
story, and to  think, in  some shadowy corner of  the  mind, of  the  dead at 
Gettysburg  as a small price to pay for the development of a really satisfactory 
and cheap compact car with decent pick-up and road-holding  capability. It is 
to our credit that we survived the War and tempered our national fiber in the 
process, but human decency and the future security of our country demand 
that we look at the costs. What are some of the costs?  Robert Penn Warren, 
The Legacy of the Civil War (New York: Random House, 1961),  pp. 49-50. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE  economic  impact  of the American  Civil  War  has  received  a 
prominent  place in historical  literature.  It has been extensively 
debated since the publication of the controversial  works of Louis 
Hacker and Charles and Mary Beard. The effects of the war on 
industrialization  and income distribution  have been discussed in a 
long series  of articles  among  which those of Cochran,  Salsbury,  and 
Engerman  are best known.' The debate has been comprehensive, 
We  would  like to  thank Stanley Engerman, Hugh  Rockoff, Richard Sutch, and 
three referees for their helpful comments. 
1 See  Thomas C.  Cochran, "Did  the  Civil  War Retard Industrialization?"  Mis- 
sissippi  Valley  Historical  Review,  XLVIII  (September  1961),  197-210;  Stanley 
Engerman, "The Economic Impact of the Civil War," Explorations  in Entrepreneurial 
History, Second Series, III  (Spring-Summer 1966),  176-199; Stephen Salsbury, "The 
Effect of the Civil War on American Industrial Development," in  Ralph Andreano, 
editor, The Economic Impact of  the  American Civil War  (New  York: Schenkman 
Publishing Co.,  1967).  The  Cochran and  Engerman articles are also  reprinted in 
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but unfortunately  one is still unable to draw firm conclusions  from 
the present  data concerning  crucial  issues.  Although  it is now known 
that the war's immediate impact was not expansionary, its long range 
effects are still unclear. 
We hope that this article will help to resolve some of the broader 
issues  concerning  the  economic  effects  of  the  war.  Although  this 
work does not answer completely the questions raised by the classic 
studies in this field, it does provide data which should be helpful in 
unriddling some of them. 
The initial sections of this article contain estimates of the cost of 
the American Civil War to the Union  and the  Confederacy. These 
cost  estimates  are  of  two  types,  direct  and  indirect.  The  direct 
measure is computed by adding up the  actual war expenditures of 
both  sides. We  discuss the limitations of this procedure and intro- 
duce an indirect estimate which avoids most of the shortcomings of 
the previous method. This indirect estimate is computed under the 
assumption that a particular consumption stream would have existed 
in the  absence  of the  conflict. The  discounted  difference between 
this consumption stream and that actually achieved  constitutes the 
indirect measure of  the  cost  of  the  war. The  final sections  of  the 
paper use these estimates to resolve various economic issues involv- 
ing the total and distributive effects of the war. These  sections are 
meant to be  suggestive  of future research and are not intended  to 
be exhaustive. 
The cost of any war is difficult to measure. As John Maurice Clark 
wrote in his preface  to The Costs  of the World  War  to the American 
People, "[a] study of war costs is either a relatively simple matter of 
tabulation and fiscal allocation; or else it is an economic problem of 
insoluble difficulty."2  When a war involves an economy only to the 
extent of providing men  and machines  this  accounting procedure, 
as Clark suggests, is easy and appropriate. But when  the war also 
involves  the  destruction of  productive  capital,  political  instability 
and changes  in  the  composition of  the  labor force,  complications 
abound.  Further problems  can  be  added  if  the  victor  extracts  a 
reparation at the end of the conflict. 
the Andreano volume. See also Harry N.  Scheiber, "Economic Change in the  Civil 
War Era: An Analysis of Recent Studies," Civil War History, II  (December  1965), 
for a summary  of these and other papers. 
2  John Maurice Clark, The Costs of the World War to the American People (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1931),  p. xi. American Civil  War  301 
A computation  of the cost of the American  Civil War involves all 
of these complications.  The mere adding up of expenditures  on the 
war effort and the yalue of destroyed  physical and human capital 
does not equal the total cost of the conflict,  for it neglects the costs 
of instability, commercial stoppage and other economic factors.3 
Furthermore,  Louis Hacker  and Charles  and Mary  Beard  have sug- 
gested social and political reasons  for doubting  that this summation 
equals  the net cost.4 
Although  the cost of the American  Civil  War  is referred  to in many 
studies, no systematic computation  has been made of it. Even a 
recent volume of essays on the economic impact of the Civil War 
does not include an estimate.' Despite the fact that no complete 
study of Civil War costs has been made, several researchers  have 
suggested  the extent to which the war drained  the economy during 
its four years. However, these studies have equated war costs with 
the totality of military expenditures  and capital destruction and 
have thereby  omitted  both possible additional  costs and benefits.6 
Some  researchers  who have studied  these war costs have neglected 
human  casualties,  although  for many purposes  these costs should  be 
included.  There  are several  methods  of estimating  the loss of human 
3  On the issue of commercial stoppage see R. A. Kessel and A. A. Alchian, "Real 
Wages in the North During the Civil War: Mitchell's Data Reinterpreted,"  reprinted 
in Andreano, The Economic Impact of the American Civil War. 
4 Charles and Mary Beard interpret the Civil War as enabling the North through 
victory to achieve greater economic progress. The Beards state, "The Second Amer- 
ican Revolution, while destroying the economic foundation of the slaveowning aristoc- 
racy, assured the triumph of business enterprise. .  ..  In 1860, just a little more than 
a billion dollars was invested in manufacturing and only  1,500,000 industrial wage 
earners were employed in the United States. In less than fifty years the capital had 
risen to more than twelve billion and the number of wage earners to 5,500,000...." 
(See  The Rise of American Civilization [New  York: Macmillan Co.,  1927],  II, pp. 
166-192.)  Louis M. Hacker repeated the  same theme.  "From about  1843  on,  this 
process [the  conversion of  mercantile capitalism into  industrial capitalism] visibly 
began to take place, stopping short of complete fulfillment because the rising indus- 
trial-capitalist  class was not in possession of the instrumentalities  of political power. 
In short, industrial capitalism, it became apparent by the late  1850's, was incapable 
of achieving full maturity unless it had control of the  state. In these terms we  are 
to read the meaning of the Civil War; for that conflict was a revolution in the sense 
that it represented a desperate struggle for political power between two classes each 
of  which  required control of  the  state to  underwrite its  own  economic and  social 
programs." (See  The Triumph of American Capitalism [New  York: Columbia Uni- 
versity Press, 19401, p. 200.) 
5 Andreano, The Economic Impact of the American Civil War. 
6 For  example, see  Fred  Shannon, America's Economic Growth  (3rd  ed.;  New 
York: Macmillan Co., 1951),  pp. 325-326. Shannon complicates matters even further 
by not discounting, by not deflating, and by counting the emancipation of slaves as 
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life. Using a human  capital approach,  a summation  of both the fore- 
gone earnings  of those who died and the difference  between actual 
and hypothetical  earnings  of those who were wounded can be a fair 
approximation  of these costs. It is important  to note that the method 
of evaluating  war deaths and war wounds  depends critically  on how 
the war cost estimate is to be applied. A human capital approach 
appears justified if one wants to know the extent to which gross 
national product or some other measure of economic activity was 
reduced as a consequence  of the war. But if one is considering  the 
losses experienced  by those who survived  the war, inclusion  of the 
full marginal  products  of those who did not would be unjustified. 
In the empirical analysis which follows, the simple method of 
calculating war costs, involving the summation  of all war-related 
expenditures  and losses, is termed the "direct"  estimate. In our cal- 
culations  this statistic includes all Union and Confederate  war ex- 
penditures,  and human and physical capital destroyed in military 
actions.  But because the estimate  produced  by this simple addition 
is incomplete  we have constructed  an "indirect"  measure.  We have 
created  for this purpose  a hypothetical  North and South7  which did 
not fight a war during the years 1861 to 1865. The consumption 
stream  of persons  in the warless  economy  is compared  to that actually 
achieved with the war. The discounted  value of the difference  be- 
tween these two streams  represents  the net costs (or possibly net 
benefits) of the war. 
The indirect  cost of the war has been calculated  two ways. In one 
calculation,  called the indirect cost to the "native"  population,  we 
compute the cost of the war to those persons  living in the U.S. in 
1861 and to their descendants.  Therefore,  we have not considered 
in this estimate that portion of the war's economic impact passed 
on to those who emigrated  after 1861. This variant  is important,  for 
example,  in interpreting  political decisions  made in 1861. 
A second indirect computation  yielded the total net cost of the 
war to all persons in the United States. It therefore  also includes 
the cost of the war to those who entered the U.S. after 1861. The 
difference  between this indirect and the direct estimate represents 
the cost of all items which could not be  computed directly. For 
7 We  equate  the  Union  with  the  North and  the  Confederacy with  the  South 
merely for literary purposes. American Civil  War  303 
example,  if computed  for the Union this measure  would include any 
redistributive  gains  from  political  victory. 
THE  DIRECT  COST OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 
General  Method 
The direct estimate of the cost of the war, as we have noted, in- 
cludes all war expenditures  by both Union and Confederate  govern- 
ments (including  state and local outlays), and the value of destroyed 
human  and physical  capital.  In only a limited  way are the losses due 
to the disruptive  effects of the war included  in this calculation,  and 
any gross  benefits  from the war are not incorporated.8 
The direct cost of the war for the North is simpler to calculate 
than for the South.  The records  of the Union government  are more 
complete and more accurate  than those of the Confederacy.  Even 
more important, the  destruction of  physical capital was  almost 
wholly concentrated  in the South. 
The Direct Cost of the Civil War to the North 
The components  of our direct estimate  for the North are given in 
Table 1. Because  supporting  materials  for this calculation  and many 
8 The  direct cost  of  the  war can be  represented graphically using  the  familiar 
production possibilities frontier where  the  axes  include  both  present  and  future 
consumption of the  outputs guns and butter. The  distance AB in  the figure below 
represents  all expenditures  on war machinery. CE is the direct measure of the cost of 
Guns 
_Z~ 
4 
fth  war 
F  C  0  E  Butter 
the war, but since it  is  evaluated at the  current price ratio, the  true cost is  over- 
stated by  DE.  However, since  annual expenditures were a  minor fraction of  total 
product (about  10  to 20  percent of  GNP for both  North and South)  DE  can be 
considered negligible. This follows because the marginal cost curve of guns probably 
had a very high elasticity. The direct cost estimate also may exceed actual foregone 
consumption  because the war may have generated an increase in work effort shifting 
the production possibilities curve outward. We have not considered this point in our 
analysis. The destruction of human and physical capital shifts the production possi- 
bilities frontier inward, say to  the  dotted curve in  the  diagram. The  distance FC 
represents  additional foregone future consumption of butter due to the loss of produc- 
tive capital. The total direct cost of the war is the sum of CD and FC. 304  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
TABLE  1 
DIRECT COST OF THE  CIVIL WAR TO THE  NORTHa 
(Thousands, 1860 $) 
(1)  Expenditure by  the  Federal Covernmentb  $1,805,597 
(2)  Expenditure by  State and  Local  Governmentse  485,673 
(3)  Additional Cost Due  to  the  Draftd  11,035 
(4)  Human  Capital  Loss: 
( a)  Killede  954,922 
(b)  Woundedf  364,734 
(5)  Less:  Risk Premiums in  Soldiers' Wage Billsg  -256,115 
(6)  Total Direct Cost to  the  North  $3,365,846 
a  All values are discounted at 6 percent to June 30,  1861. We justify this rate on 
the  grounds that nonrisky interest rates during the  period 1861  to  1909  averaged 
about 6 percent. See Table XV of supporting documents available upon request from 
either author. This set of tables will be referred to as "Notes." The  Warren-Pearson 
wholesale price index, with minor adjustments, has been  used  as the  deflator. See 
Table I of "Notes." 
b  This figure excludes military costs which would have been incurred  without a war 
and includes the cost of demobilization. See Tables II-VI of "Notes." 
c We have assumed for the purposes of discounting and deflating that the expendi- 
tures by state and local governments  were distributed over time as that of the federal 
government. This figure also includes state and local bounties. See Tables VII and 
VIII of "Notes." 
d  This cost was in addition to military payment by the federal government due to 
the purchasing of  substitutes and the  draft. For example, if  a  substitute was  paid 
$150 by someone who had been drafted, a real war cost would not be included in 
federal expenditures.  We have chosen $150 as an average substitute payment because 
Shannon reports that  "Philadelphia was  filled  with  candidates from  other  states 
offering themselves as substitutes to the highest bidder. Some were said to have sold 
as low as $50 and $150 was a moderate price. When a few sold at $250 the price, 
considering the  condition of the market, was thought to be  exorbitant." (Shannon, 
The Organization and Administration  of  the  Union Army, 1861-1865,  p.  61.)  The 
number of men who were drafted and served or who were drafted and supplied a 
substitute was  162,535  (Kriedberg and  Henry,  History of  Military Mobilization, 
p. 113).  Drafting of soldiers was used in July 1863, and March, July, and December 
of 1864. We use $150 (current) as the average per man cost either for being drafted 
or for procuring a substitute. See Table IX of "Notes." 
e  The cost resulting from Civil War deaths is taken as the expected wage rate of 
those killed multiplied by  the  number who would have survived to  a  given year, 
summed over all years. The hypothetical earnings used for those actually killed are 
computed from weighted averages of actual farm and non-farm wages for the post- 
war period. This is justified because the number of  persons expected to have Been 
working in  1879 had the  war not  occurred is  only  4.3%  greater than the  actual 
workforce,  and it is only 2.8% greater for 1880. See Tables X and XI of "Notes." 
f  The number of Union soldiers wounded has been estimated at 275,175  (Randall 
and Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction,  p.  531).  We  assume there was an 
average loss of one-half potential earning capacity from these wounds. 
g  Including the value of human capital destruction in the total direct cost would 
constitute double counting if soldiers received higher pay as risk premiums. A com- 
parison of civilian and military wage rates indicates that this additional compensation 
was slight. We infer either that soldiers underestimated  the probabilities of death and 
injury or that patriotic duty was a sufficient incentive. The estimate presented above 
is the difference between military and civilian earnings, where military wages include 
costs transferred  to drafted soldiers. The Union army and navy strength is given by 
Kendrick as: American Civil  War  305 
1861  55,600 
1862  537,400 
1863  924,300 
1864  913,600 
1865  961,600 
Kendrick cites F.  B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the  U.S. Army 
from its Organization, September 29,  1789 to March 2,  1903, Vol. II  (Washington, 
D.C.:  U.S.G.P.O., 1903),  p. 626 and "figures  furnished by the Adjutant General"  as 
his sources. 
Sources: For line  (1)  D.  R.  Dewey,  Financial History of  the  United States, 12th 
edition (New  York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939),  p. 329; M. S. Ken- 
drick, "A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures,"  NBER occasional 
paper  #48  (New  York: NBER,  1955);  R. Gallman, unpublished national 
income estimates (June 1965).  (2)  A. Bolles, The Financial History of the 
U.S. from 1861  to 1865  (New  York: D.  Appleton and Co.,  1886);  F.  A. 
Shannon, The Organization and Administration  of the  Union Army, 1861- 
1865, Vol. 2  (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, Co., 1928),  p. 80; M. A. Kried- 
berg and M. G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization  in the United States 
Army: 1774-1945,  Department of  Army Pamphlet No.  20-212  (Dept.  of 
the Army, June 1955),  pp. 106 and 109. (3)  F. A. Shannon, The Organiza- 
tion and Administration of the  Union Army, p.  80;  M. A. Kriedberg and 
M. G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the  United States Army: 
1774-1945,  pp.  106  and  109.  (4)  S.  Lebergott, Manpower in  Economic 
Growth, (New  York: McCraw-Hill, 1964),  pp.  510,  528,  539,  and  523; 
J. G. Randall and D.  Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Lexing- 
ton, Massachusetts:  D.C. Heath and Co., 1969),  p. 531; Historical Statistics, 
pp.  30,  71  and 738.  (5)  M. A.  Kriedberg an  M. G.  Henry, History of 
Military Mobilization in the  United States Army: 1774-1945, p.  110; M. S. 
Kendrick, "A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures,"  p. 95. 
others  in this article  are too extensive  to be reproduced  here, a set of 
tables (referred  to as "Notes"  in the text) is available  upon request 
from  either  author.  The total direct cost of the war to the North  was 
about  3.4 billion 1860  -dollars.  The expenditure  by the federal  govern- 
ment on soldiers'  pay plus bounties and the physical machinery  of 
war accounts  for a little more than one half of this total. This ex- 
penditure  includes  costs incurred  during  the war and demobilization 
periods minus a hypothetical cost of maintaining defense in the 
absence of the war. State and local governments  also financed  the 
war, paying out substantial  bounties  to attract  quota-filling  soldiers. 
A military  draft  instituted  in 1863 shifted some costs from taxpayers 
to soldiers  and those who furnished  substitutes.  We have included 
this item as well. 
Approximately  360,000 Union soldiers died due to war-related 
causes.9  The monetary  loss from these casualties  is computed  as the 
9 Randall and Donald put total Union deaths at 360,222.  See J. G. Randall and 
D.  Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (2nd  ed. revised; Lexington, Mass.: 
D.C.  Heath and  Co.,  1969),  p.  531.  M. A.  Kriedberg and  M.  G.  Henry  (History 306  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
present  value of the foregone  income  which would have been earned 
by these men. It comprises  less than one-third  of the total cost.'0 
We have also added the cost of non-fatal wounds and have sub- 
tracted the monetary  compensation  for risk of death and injury  al- 
ready included in the soldiers'  wage bill. All costs are viewed from 
June 30, 1861 and discounted  at six percent to that date. 
The Direct Cost of the Civil War to the South 
The direct cost of the war to the South is far more difficult  to 
calculate  than that for the North. This partially  reflects  the chaotic 
supply efforts  of the Confederate  government  for which individual 
states as well as private citizens contributed.  Records  were poorly 
maintained and deliberately neglected in  the many cases where 
impressment  took place. The failure  of the Confederate  government 
to pay many of their troops also accounts for incomplete data on 
costs."' 
Our computations  yield an estimate  of this cost, given in Table 2, 
at 2.89 billion 1860  dollars  in 1861.  However,  these figures  are highly 
suspect.  The expenditures  enumerated  by the Confederate  and state 
and local governments  amount  to a trivial  half billion dollars  in com- 
parison  with over  2 billion 1860  dollars  spent by the Union.  A simple 
calculation  of the expenditures  per active soldier  for the North and 
South  yields such disparate  figures  as to cast doubt on the southern 
estimate. We  conclude this figure is  biased downward for even 
of  Military Mobilization in  the  U.S.  Army: 1775-1945,  Department of  the  Army 
Pamphlet No.  20-212  [Washington, D.C.:  Dept.  of  the  Army, June 1955],  p.  97) 
report 359,528 Union deaths, and the U.S. Bureau of the  Census (Historical Statis- 
tics of the  U.S.: Colonial Times to 1957  [Washington, D.C.:  U.S.G.P.O., 1960],  p. 
735)  puts this figure at 364,511. The  Randall and Donald estimate is  used in  our 
analysis. 
10 For many purposes the addition of monetary losses due to deaths and injuries 
would be clearly inappropriate.  We have therefore presented these data separately. 
11 For descriptions of  the coordination of  ordnance activities see  Frauik  E.  Van- 
diver, Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance (Austin: 
University of  Texas Press, 1952).  Charles W.  Ramsdell, Behind the  Lines  in  the 
Southern Confederacy (Baton  Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1944)  also 
recounts the  well  intentioned but  ineffective southern efforts at  maintaining both 
military troops and civilians in  times of  extreme scarcity. On troop pay,  Harry N. 
Scheiber  ("The  Pay  of  Confederate Troops and  Problems of  Demoralization: A 
Case  of  Administrative Failure," Civil  War History, XV  [1969])  states that  con- 
federate inability to  meet  payrolls was  encountered early in  the  war. Bell  Wiley, 
The  Life  of Johnny Reb  (New  York: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,  1943)  also discusses this 
problem and the steps the rebels took to provide for their families in the absence of 
military pay. If and when the soldiers were finally paid, it was usually in far lower 
real terms than had been  promised, due  to  rapid inflation. This partially accounts 
for the low reported expenditures  given in Table 2. American Civil  War  307 
though northern  forces were exceptionally  well-equipped it is im- 
probable that the opportunity  cost of Confederate  manpower  and 
resources per  active  soldier was  forty percent that  for  Union 
troops.12 
One of the major  factors  biasing downward  these expenditures  is 
the seizure of goods which became quite common as the war pro- 
gressed and inflation  mounted. The Confederate  army forced sales 
at lower than current  prices and when convenient charged prices 
quoted during previous transactions.  Because inflation was quite 
rapid, equivalent transactions  just a month apart in 1863 differed 
in price by as much as twenty percent. Goods were also seized 
without compensation.'3  In addition, military pay was frequently 
delayed  and  paid in much depreciated  currency  or withheld  entirely. 
Contemporary  descriptions  of the extent of seizure and failure to 
pay troops  imply that expenditure  data for the Confederacy,  espe- 
cially during the period after 1863, understate  the true cost of the 
war. We have therefore constructed an adjusted calculation (see 
Table 3)  using the assumption  that the opportunity  cost of a Con- 
federate soldier equalled that of a Union soldier.14  The total labor 
cost is therefore  a multiple of the average size of the Confederate 
army and the Union wage.15  To obtain the cost of capital for the 
Confederate forces we  assume that equipment expenditures  per 
Confederate  soldier were one-half those of the Union. The total 
adjusted  figure  is not particularly  sensitive  to changes  in this assump- 
tion, since labor costs comprise fifty-seven  percent of total Union 
expenditures.  Reducing this proportion  to one-fourth  or increasing 
it  to three-fourths  changes our adjusted expenditure  estimate by 
only $232 million,  or about seven percent of our figure  for the total 
direct cost to the South. In addition, the South, like the North, 
transferred  some  war costs to soldiers  through  the use of a draft,  and 
these costs were added to the direct estimate. 
Physical capital destruction  accounts for over one-third of the 
12  This statistic can be calculated using Tables 1 and 2 and estimates of military 
manpower given in Table 2, fn. g. 
13  "[O]n March 26,  1863  .. .  [the Confederate] Congress approved an act autho- 
rizing and regulating the impressment of private property for public use.  .  .  . Before 
supplies could be  impressed, officers had to try to buy them from the  owner.... 
Originally, the list prices were only slightly less than the market price, but by  the 
end of the war they had dropped far below." Richard C. Todd, Confederate Finance 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954),  pp. 165-171. 
14  See Table 2,  fn. e, for a justification  of this assumption. 
15 See Table XII of "Notes" for Union army wage rates. 308  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
TABLE  2 
DIRECT COST OF THE  CIVIL WAR TO THE  SOUTHa 
(Thousands,  1860  $) 
Reported  Adjusted" 
(1)  Expenditures by the  Confederate Government and 
Auxiliary State and Local Covernmentsb  $617,967  $1,011,158 
(2)  Additional Costs Due  to the  Drafte  20,368 
(3)  Decrease in the  Value of Physical Capitald  1,487,241 
(4)  Human Capital Loss: 
(a)  Killede  683,939 
(b)  Woundedf  261,231 
(5)  Less:  Risk Premiums in Soldiers' Wage Billsg  -178,037 
(6)  Total Direct Cost to  the  South  $2,892,709  $3,285,900 
a  All values are discounted at  6  percent to  June 30,  1861. Lerner's price index 
with  minor  adjustments was  used.  See  E.  Lerner, "Money, Prices,  and  Wages 
in  the  Confederacy, 1861-1865," in  R.  Andreano, The  Economic  Impact  of  the 
American Civil War. 
b  This figure includes loans, treasury notes, taxes, tariffs, reported seizures, and 
donations. See Table XIII of "Notes." 
e  Using Randall and Donald's estimates (p.  252)  we  assume 300,000  men were 
conscripted and that on average the cost imposed on them was the same as for Union 
draftees. This may bias our figure downward since a much higher percentage of the 
Confederate population was drafted. 
d  Physical capital destruction in the South is measured by the difference between 
the value of (non-slave)  capital in 1860 and that at the end of the war. The pre-war 
estimate is based on the true rather than appraised valuation of capital given in the 
1860 Census for the eleven states which seceded, with an adjustment to account for 
the formation of West Virginia. Because of the inadequacy of the 1870 Census with 
respect to the South, our post-war estimate is based on an 1880 Census valuation of 
capital. We assume that the rate of growth of capital per person between 1870 and 
1880 was the same in the South as it was in the North for Engerman observes that 
commodity output per capita grew at the same rate in both regions. (See  S. Enger- 
man, "The Economic Impact of the Civil War," reprinted in R. Andreano, Economic 
Impact of the American Civil War.) Our capital destruction  figure is highly tentative. 
But although we are unable to assess the magnitude of all possible biases, it appears 
that if we have erred it is in the direction of overestimating  the true capital loss. This 
lends further support to our conclusion in the latter part of the paper that the direct 
estimate is less than the indirect one.  See "A Note  on Physical Destruction in  the 
South" in "Notes." 
e  We accept Randall and Donald's estimate of 258,000 Confederate deaths (p. 531) 
and assume the cost per man to be equal in the North and South. This is justified on 
the grounds that free per capita income in the South was approximately  equal to that 
in the North in 1860. 
f  We  assume here, due to a lack of southern statistics, that the ratio of  dead to 
wounded was identical in the North as in the South and apply the same logic as in 
Table 1, fn. f. 
g This figure is based on the  same alternative wage  data used for the North in 
Table  1. We  have, following Boatner, based the  relative average strength of  Con- 
federate versus Union forces at (1,082,119/1,556,678)  but use the absolute figures of 
Kendrick  "A Century and a Half" for the Union to get the Confederate  troop numbers. 
(See  Table 1, fn. g.)  As in the northern figures we have not attempted to  include 
civilian personnel which Van Riper and Scheiber estimate at 70,000 at the height of 
operations. 
h  See text and Table 3 for a discussion of the adjusted figure. American Civil  War  309 
Sources: For  line  (1):  R.  C.  Todd,  Confederate Finance  (Athens:  University of 
Georgia Press, 1954).  (2):  J. G. Randall and D. Donald, The Civil War and 
Reconstruction. (3):  1870 Federal Census: Industry and Wealth; 1880 Fed- 
eral Census: Valuation, Taxation and Public Indebtedness. (4):  J. C. Ran- 
dall and D. Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction.  (5):  M. M. Boatner, 
The  Civil  War  Dictionary  (New  York: David  McKay Co.,  1959),  pp. 
602-603. 
adjusted direct cost of the war. We have arrived  at this figure by 
subtracting  the discounted and deflated value of physical capital 
(excluding  slaves) at the end of the war from  that at the beginning. 
The procedure  used is partially described  in Table 2, note d, and 
the final  estimate  should  be considered  tentative  and probably  biased 
upward. 
THE  INDIRECT  COSTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 
General Method 
The direct  computation  of the cost of the war is obviously  deficient 
in several respects. It does not fully account for all costs, and fur- 
thermore  it does not allow for possible benefits to accrue either to 
the North  or more  remotely  to the entire economy  from the shifting 
of political power. Therefore,  we have devised an indirect method 
of estimating  this statistic which incorporates  all possible costs and 
benefits to wartime citizens as well as those to future generations. 
This indirect estimate is disaggregated  by cost to Union versus 
Confederate  citizens and computed  in two ways depending on the 
definition  of a citizen. One estimate defines citizens as all residents, 
that is it includes immigrants  who entered the U.S. after the war 
began. The other computes  the cost to only those living in the U.S. 
at the outbreak  of the conflict  and to their descendants. 
The general method used is to create a hypothetical economy 
which did not fight the war. Although various assumptions  con- 
cerning the growth of per capita consumption  are made, the basic 
supposition  is that in the absence of war the economy would have 
grown at its pre-war  rate.  For example,  the hypothetical  southern 
16 The basic assumption  chosen is, of course, one of many which could be applied 
to such a hypothetical warless economy. Nonetheless, there is some evidence to sup- 
port our choice. George Rogers Taylor concluded in "The National Economy Before 
and After the  Civil War," that "the economy had  developed a  tremendous thrust 
during the  1840's and  1850's, a  momentum the  Civil  War may have  temporarily 
retarded or accelerated but could not, or at least did not, fundamentally affect." See 
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TABLE  3 
ADJUSTED EXPENDITURE ESTIMATE FOR THE  CONFEDERACY 
(Thousands, 1860  $ in  1861) 
Union  Confederacy (adjusted) 
(1)  Wage Billa  787,403.7  547,360.8 
(2)  Capital Expendituresb  1,334,387.3  463,797.2 
(3)  Total Expenditures During the Warc  2,121,791.0  1,011,158.0 
a  The  Union wage bill  was  calculated from regular army pay plus bounties for 
Union soldiers. See Table XII of  "Notes." We  assume that wages were paid from 
April 1861 to April 1865 and use Kendrick's  troop figures for the North. We compute 
a per soldier wage bill for the North and then apply it to the  South. See Table 2, 
fn. g, for our method of computing Confederate troop strength. 
b  Rows (3)  -  (1)  for Union. See text for discussion of Confederate figure. 
c  Total Union expenditures  equal Table 1, line (1)  +  line (2)  -  $170 million, the 
cost of demobilization. See Table IV of "Notes." The Confederate total expenditure 
figure is line  (1)  +  line  (2). 
Sources: See above and text. 
economy is assumed to have experienced  growth in its per capita 
consumption  at the average  annual  rate actually  attained  during  the 
period 1839 to 1859. Additional  assumptions,  discussed below, are 
made for the North. The discounted difference  between the two 
consumption  streams,  the hypothetical minus the actual values, is 
our indirect  estimate  of the cost of the Civil War.17 
(Greenville,  Del.:  Eleutherian Mills-Hagley  Foundation,  1965),  p.  22.  In  sum- 
marizing this conference volume Harold F. Williamson noted that with the exception 
of  commercial  banking  and  possibly  government-business relations,  "principal 
speakers and critics generally agreed that the  Civil War had  relatively little or no 
effect on the particular  institutions they were asked to discuss" (p.  172). 
17  The  indirect  cost  of  the  war  can  also  be  represented graphically using  a 
production possibilities frontier. We  again draw the  axes in  terms of  present and 
future guns and butter. If the only effect of the war were to increase the output of 
guns, from OA to OB, and reduce that for butter, from OD to OC, then the direct 
and indirect measures would  be  almost identical. We  could represent the  indirect 
cost as CD on the butter axis, that is the foregone consumption due to the war. But 
if  the war involved factors such as political instability, commercial disruption, and 
Guns 
with 
_  war 
without 
F  C  E  D  Butter 
capital destruction, the  production possibilities frontier would  shift  inward, say  to 
the  dashed curve in the  diagram, and the  cost would increase by  FC.  The  direct 
estimate picks up only part of this additional cost. Our indirect computation should 
incorporate  all foregone consumption. American  Civil War  311 
We must stress  that consumption,  not income,  is the relevant  mea- 
sure for the cost of a war. Even though measured  income may not 
decrease during a war (it may even increase), consumption  could 
fall dramatically.  Therefore,  the cost of a war may be positive al- 
though income remains constant. Furthermore any  investment 
which is destroyed  or created is evaluated in our indirect measure 
in terms  of the consumption  it inhibits or eventually generates. 
The Indirect Costs of the War to the North (excluding foregone 
consumption  of those killed) 
The indirect cost of the war to the North is the present  value in 
1861 of the decrease  in consumption  which resulted from the war. 
It can be represented  in general  terms as the following summation: 
1909  A- 
C ht  b at 
Indirect  Cost  =ZCa 
t=1861  +  i)  (t-1861) 
where Cht is hypothetical  consumption  at time t,  Cat is actual con- 
sumption  at time t, and i is the discount  rate. 
The basic assumption  employed for the North is that per capita 
consumption  would have expanded at a constant rate after 1860 
such that hypothetical  consumption  was equal to actual consump- 
tion by 1879. It is assumed,  therefore,  that the more rapid rate ob- 
served in the post-bellum  period was a "catching  up" process and 
would not have existed in the absence of the war. We feel this is a 
reasonable  assumption  because 1879 is the date for which observed 
income would equal hypothetical  income, had the warless  economy 
experienced  per capita income growth at the realized 1839 to 1859 
rate, 1.56 percent per year. We are implicitly assuming  that once 
income caught up, the war exerted no influence  on savings rates.18 
Therefore,  per capita consumption  as well as per capita income are 
equal in both the actual and hypothetical  North in 1879. This also 
Another possibility to  consider is  an outward shift in the  production possibilities 
frontier due in some way to the outcome of the war. We depict the situation in the 
North if there are benefits which accrue to the Union, as implied by the Beards and 
Hacker. The war cost the Union CD in foregone butter, but if CE of this commodity 
is returned as the  victor's prize, only ED  remains as the  net  indirect cost.  If  the 
production possibilities frontier shifts out sufficiently, CE  can be  greater than CD, 
implying that net benefits could have accrued to the citizens of the triumphant  North. 
18 For a  discussion of  the  change in  post-bellum savings rates and  its  possible 
sources see J. G. Williamson, "Watersheds and Turning Points: Conjectures on the 
Long Term Impact of Civil War Financing,"  JouRNAL  OF EcoNoMIc HISTORY,  XXXIV 
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implies that in terms of foregone consumption  the North experi- 
enced no further  war costs after 1879. We have incorporated  busi- 
ness fluctuations  by assuming  that deviations  from the trend rate of 
growth  in per capita consumption  experienced  after the war would 
also  have occurred  in the hypothetical  economy.  Alternative  assump- 
tions  for the hypothetical  consumption  streams  are considered  below, 
but we feel that those outlined above are the most plausible. 
The indirect war cost is computed separately for two  groups, 
"natives,"  and all U.S. residents. The cost to natives is the fore- 
gone consumption  experienced by  those alive in  1861 and their 
descendants.  Assuming  that persons alive in 1861 discounted  their 
children's  consumption  at the same rate at which they discounted 
their own, this estimate can be compared  to the cost of any pro- 
posals which were alternatives  to war. 
The second method, the cost to all U.S. residents, adds to the 
above estimate the foregone consumption  of all immigrants  who 
entered after the conflict  began. This estimate  will be compared  to 
the direct cost results to shed light on many of the historical  ques- 
tions raised in the above introduction. 
Table 4 lists the actual and the hypothetical  consumption  values 
in 1860 dollars  for both the native and total populations.  The dis- 
counted value of the difference  in the two streams  is 4.284 billion 
1860 dollars  in 1861 for natives only, and 4.515 billion for the total 
population in the North.19  The population and consumption  data 
underlying  our figures  are included  in the Appendix. 
The Indirect  Cost of the War  to the South (excluding  foregone  con- 
sumption  of those killed) 
The indirect  cost of the war to the South  was computed  in a simi- 
lar fashion as that for the North, although a slightly different as- 
sumption  for the hypothetical consumption  stream was used. The 
South  did not experience  as rapid a "catching  up"  process  as did the 
North. Indeed the low southern  income figures  for the post-bellum 
period have been a perennial  puzzle to economic historians.  Had 
per capita income continued to expand in the South at its realized 
1839  to 1859  rate, 1.30 percent  per year, hypothetical  income would 
have remained  higher than the actual values until as late as 1909. 
19 This assumes a 6 percent discount rate, and we present results using alternative 
rates below. These additional computations indicate that our quantitative results are 
not very sensitive to the discount value chosen. American Civil  War  313 
TABLE  4 
THE INDIRECT COST OF THE WAR TO THE NORTH 
(excluding foregone consumption  of those killed) 
Part A.  Consumption  in the Northa 
(1 )  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Natives' Consumption  All Residents' Consumption 
(1860  $, billions)  (1860  $, billions) 
Year  Actual  Hypothetical  Actual  Hypothetical 
1861  3.0441  3.1609  3.0441  3.1609 
1862  3.0334  3.2701  3.0450  3.2826 
1863  3.0106  3.3698  3.0439  3.4071 
1864  2.9845  3.4686  3.0409  3.5341 
1865  2.9513  3.5614  3.0362  3.6639 
1869  3.4397  3.9337  3.6806  4.2092 
1874  4.0229  4.3021  4.4797  4.7906 
1879  5.1908  5.1908  6.0201  6.0201 
1884  6.1739  6.1739  7.5042  7.5042 
1889  6.4868  6.4868  8.2628  8.2628 
1894  6.6277  6.6277  8.7288  8.7288 
1899  8.4953  8.4953  11.5575  11.5575 
1904  9.6173  9.6173  13.6840  13.6840 
1909  11.1590  11.1590  16.6227  16.6227 
Part B.  Indirect Cost to the North 
(excluding foregone consumption  of those killed)b 
Total (1860  $ in 1861)  Per Capita Cost 
(billions)  in 1861  (1860  $) 
(1)  Cost to native population  4.2844  183 
(2)  Cost to total population  4.5149 
a  See Table  11, "Population Statistics for the  South and  North, 1861 to  1910," 
Table 12, "Actual Per Capita Consumption,"  and Table 13, "Hypothetical Per Capita 
Consumption,"  all in the Appendix, for derivation of these figures. It should be noted 
that our 'actual'  figures for 1861 to 1865 are based on a particular  set of assumptions. 
We  have therefore computed alternative measures of both  actual and hypothetical 
consumption.  These are presented in Table 8. 
b  A 6 percent interest rate has been used to discount to  1861 the differences be- 
tween (1)  and (2),  and (3)  and (4)  of Part A. 
Sources: See above. 
Therefore per  capita consumption in  the  hypothetical, warless 
South  is assumed  to grow  at the realized  1839  to 1859  rate until 1909. 
The indirect cost for the South is  also computed for the two 
groups  defined  in the northern  case, and consumption  for the hypo- 
thetical and actual South is given in Table 5 with supporting  data 
in the Appendix.  The indirect cost in 1860 dollars  in 1861 is 9.335 
billion for natives and 8.970 billion for the total population. 
In interpreting  the indirect cost estimate for the South it should 
be noted that it encompasses  not merely the actual war costs but 
also the effects of emancipation  and reconstruction.  Therefore it 314  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
TABLE  5 
THE  INDIRECT COST OF THE  WAR TO THE  SOUTH 
(excluding foregone consumption of those killed) 
Part A.  Consumption in the Southa 
(1 )  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Natives' Consumption  All Residents' Consumption 
(1860  $, billions)  (1860  $, billions) 
Year  Actual  Hypothetical  Actual  Hypothetical 
1861  .6766  .7848  .6766  .7848 
1862  .6043  .8133  .6043  .8133 
1863  .5396  .8423  .5396  .8423 
1864  .4814  .8717  .4814  .8717 
1865  .4292  .9017  .4292  .9017 
1869  .5123  1.0268  .5123  1.0268 
1874  .6259  1.1826  .6075  1.1478 
1879  .8434  1.5023  .7937  1.4139 
1884  1.0348  1.8003  .9698  1.6873 
1889  1.1174  1.8986  1.0434  1.7729 
1894  1.1920  1.9781  1.1036  1.8314 
1899  1.5885  2.5745  1.4642  2.3729 
1904  1.9809  3.1353  1.8231  2.8856 
1909  2.5336  3.9164  2.3226  3.5903 
Part B.  Indirect Cost to the South 
(excluding foregone consumption of those killed)b 
Total (1860  $ in 1861)  Per Capita Cost 
(billions)  in 1861  (1860  $) 
(1)  Cost to native population  9.3348c  1042 
(2)  Cost to  total population  8.9695c 
a See fn. a, Table 4. 
b  See fn. b, Table 4. 
c The native population estimates for the South exceed the total population figures 
after 1869 because of outmigration (see Table 11).  Since average per capita costs in 
the  South are applied to  natives whether or not  they  migrated, the  indirect cost 
estimate for natives exceeds that for the total southern population. This also explains 
why Table 7 shows a slightly higher cost to natives than to all residents. 
Sources: See above. 
includes any change in consumption  due to  a lowering in work 
effort  by freed slaves. To the extent that freedmen  withdrew a por- 
tion of their  labor  after  emancipation  in favor  of increased  leisure  our 
estimate will be increased.  In addition, any scale economies  which 
could be reaped only from a slave plantation  economy will also be 
included.20 
20  See R. W. Fogel and S. L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of 
American Negro  Slavery (Boston:  Little  Brown and  Co.,  1974),  Chapter 6  for a 
discussion of  scale  economies. Other war  and  emancipation related costs  are also 
included. For example, the value of cotton burned during the war is implicitly incor- 
porated in the indirect measure. Although there is no estimate of the quantity actually 
destroyed, most accounts report it was substantial. See C. Eaton, A History of  the 
Southern Confederacy (New  York: Macmillan Co., 1954),  p. 241. American Civil War  315 
Although we  cannot completely disassociate  the effects of  the 
Civil War from those of emancipation,  we have attempted to esti- 
mate the impact of a decrease  in work effort  by freedmen.  Follow- 
ing R. Ransom  and R. Sutch,  we have computed  the decline in con- 
sumption  due to increased  leisure at $1.96 billion (1860 dollars  in 
1861). This uses Ransom  and Sutch's  estimate of a thirty-two  per- 
cent decline in work effort for every year following emancipation. 
We have applied this number  as an upper bound and conclude that 
this one factor does not serve to explain the large change in con- 
sumption in the post-bellum South. Indeed it  accounts for only 
one-third  of the unexplained  portion (indirect minus direct) of the 
total indirect measure.2' 
21  R. Ransom and R. Sutch (What Was Freedom Worth? [forthcoming], Chapter 
3,  "The Myth of the  Devastated South") estimate that total male equivalent work 
hours supplied to agriculture  per capita declined by about 32 percent due to emanci- 
pation (p.  13).  The average wage rate of farm labor in the states which seceded was 
$182.08 (current) in 1870. See S. Lebergott, Manpower in Economic Growth (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1964),  p.  539  for monthly earnings, and  H.  T.  Eldridge and 
D. S. Thomas, Demographic Analysis and Interrelations,  Population Redistribution  and 
Economic Growth: United States, 1870-1950, Vol. 1  (Philadelphia: American Philo- 
sophical Society, 1964),  pp.  609-621  for the  farm labor force used  as weights  in 
each state. Wage rates are augmented by  one third to  allow for board. The  1860 
slave  population in  the  states which  seceded  (3,521,110)  is  assumed to  increase 
between  1860 and  1870  at the  rate given for all blacks in  the  South, implying a 
freedman population of  4,239,461  in  1870.  Applying  Ransom and  Sutch's cohort 
shares (p.  13),  multiplying by  the  fraction of  each  group engaged in  agriculture, 
and adjusting  for the lower productivity and shorter  work year of women and children 
yields  1,704,800 male-equivalent workers in  1870.  This  group earned by  our cal- 
culations 213,836 thousand 1860 dollars but would have received 47.3 percent more 
at the higher 1860 work levels. This addition represents 18.97 percent of actual 1870 
southern consumption. Therefore, the higher pre-war work effort increases measured 
consumption in  1870  by  18.97  percent. Applying  this  same  proportion to  actual 
southern consumption in  every year following the  Civil War yields a  total present 
value for the increased leisure of former slaves of  $1.96 billions of  1860 dollars in 
1861. 
We believe this figure is an upper bound because the Ransom and Sutch estimate 
of the decline in work effort appears quite high. For example, in a recent paper R. 
Keith Aufhauser suggests that work effort in Louisiana by ex-slaves and poor whites 
together rose after the war. Therefore, even if  the  work effort of  ex-slaves fell,  it 
may have been offset by an increase in work by the whites. See R. K. Aufhauser,  "The 
Effects  of  Emancipation  in  Louisiana  and  Jamaica," unpublished  manuscript 
(Queen's University, N.Y.).  In  addition, although work effort may  have  dropped 
substantially  just after emancipation, it probably rose in subsequent decades. 
Gavin Wright, "Cotton Competition and the Post-Bellum Recovery of the American 
South," JouRNAL  OF ECONOMIC  HISTORY,  XXXIV (September 1974),  610-635,  dis- 
counts the importance of the decline in work effort and the loss of scale economies, 
relative to the issue of the growth in demand for cotton. He states that "productive 
efficiency per se may be less important  for the study of southern income growth than 
the position of the South in the world economy" (p.  635).  If the demand for cotton 
rose at a slower rate after than before the war, some of our indirect measure would 
be capturing this change, which is probably not due to the war. 316  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
TABLE  6 
INDIRECT COST DUE  TO LOSS OF  LIFE 
1860 $ in 1861  (billions) 
(1)  Cost to  Northa  .7106 
(2)  Cost to  South  .5090 
a  We  arrive at these figures by multiplying hypothetical per capita consumption 
in each year by the number of war related deaths for that year, and then discounting 
to  1861. We apply hypothetical per capita consumption in the North to both Union 
and Confederate dead since the average per capita income of free southerners was 
approximately equal to that of northerners  in  1861. 
Sources: See above. 
The indirect estimates have so far ignored some of the losses 
stemming  from war deaths.22  Because the indirect measure  is con- 
strued  as foregone  consumption,  war wounds  which decreased  earn- 
ing ability  have been implicitly  included.  In addition,  losses to those 
alive due to the deaths of specific,  complementary  factors  have also 
been accounted.  Therefore  the only cost which the indirect  estimate 
has not considered  is the decline in consumption  of those who died 
as a result  of the war. To compute  this cost we have included  in the 
hypothetical  North and South  those persons  who were killed during 
the war by extending their lives to what they would have been in 
the absence of the war.23  This additional  cost due to war-related 
deaths is enumerated  in Table 6. 
Table 7 ties together all the indirect estimates  presented in this 
section. The total indirect cost represents  all net consumption  lost 
because of the Civil War. Consumption  declined globally  by 14.704 
billion 1860 dollars,  in 1861,  with the South  bearing  about sixty-five 
percent of the war's  burden. 
Alternative  Indirect  Estimates 
Our  estimate  of the indirect  cost of the Civil War  to the North and 
the South depends crucially  on assumptions  concerning  the rate at 
which the economy would have grown in the absence of conflict 
and the rate at which actual consumption  changed during  the war. 
In order to ascertain  the sensitivity of our results to the particular 
22  We have separated costs due to war deaths from other components because this 
is an item which can be computed in several ways depending on one's point of view. 
In addition, there are many uses of these statistics for which an estimate including 
war deaths would be inappropriate. 
23  Note that we have excluded children who would have been born to men whose 
deaths were due to the war. American Civil  War  317 
TABLE  7 
TOTAL INDIRECT COST OF THE  CIVIL WAR 
1860 $ in 1861  (billions) 
Natives  All Residents 
(1)  North  4.9950  5.2255 
(2)  South  9.8438  9.4785 
(3)  Total  14.8388  14.7040 
a  See footnote c, Table 5. 
Sources: Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
assumptions chosen we have reestimated them on the basis of alter- 
native hypotheses. 
Actual per capita consumption under the  alternative assumption 
is constructed to  decline  at a constant rate throughout the  period 
1861 to 1869, rather than to decline from 1861 to 1865 and then rise 
from 1865 to 1869 at the realized 1869 to 1879 rate. The alternative 
assumption for the  hypothetical  economy,  which  finds its roots in 
the works of Hacker and the Beards, is that in the absence of war 
the northern economy would have grown at a rate slower than that 
achieved during the pre-war period. This is also applied to the South 
in light  of  the  presumption of  many  that  southern growth would 
have  declined  even  without  the war.24  We have  chosen the rather 
low  rate of one percent  as our alternative rate of change in hypo- 
thetical  per capita consumption from 1861 to  1879 and apply  the 
hypothetical rate used above for the period after 1879. 
We present three cases using these  alternative assumptions. The 
first uses the original actual stream and the alternative hypothetical 
stream. The  second  applies  the  alternative  actual  stream and  the 
original hypothetical  stream  and  the  third  uses  both  alternative 
streams. 
The  indirect  cost  estimates  given  in  Table  8  for the  South  are 
fairly insensitive to changes in our assumptions about the hypothet- 
ical and actual growth rates, and for the  set of assumptions (Case 
3)  which  minimizes the  cost  of the war, the  indirect measure de- 
clines  by  only  fourteen  percent.  That  for  the  North  is  somewhat 
more sensitive to changes in our assumptions, and the set  (Case  3) 
most unfavorable to our conclusions results in only half the previ- 
24  Most of  these  arguments concern the  detrimental effects  of  slavery on  the 
southern economy. For an excellent summary of this literature see R. W. Fogel and 
S.  L.  Engerman, "The  Economics  of  Slavery," in  their  The  Reinterpretation of 
American  Economic History (New  York: Harper and Row, 1972). 318  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
TABiEu  8 
INDIRECT COST OF THE  CIVIL WAR UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONSa 
(billions of 1860 $ in 1861) 
Case lb  Case 2c  Case 3d 
North: 
Cost, excluding foregone consumption 
of  those killed  2.9116  3.1745  1.5712 
Foregone consumption of those killed  .6997  .7106  .6997 
Total  3.6113  3.8851  2.2709 
South: 
Cost, excluding foregone consumption 
of those killed  8.0203  8.2420  7.2928 
Foregone consumption  of those killed  .5011  .5089  .5011 
Total  8.5214  8.7509  7.7939 
a A 6 percent discount rate is used and the cost is computed for all residents. 
b  Actual stream unchanged; new hypothetical stream. See Appendix Table 14. 
c Hypothetical stream unchanged; new actual stream. See Appendix Table 14. 
d  New actual and new hypothetical streams. See Appendix Table 14. 
Sources: See above. 
ously measured indirect cost. Although this may appear to be  a 
large  change,  it does not drastically  affect  our qualitative  results. 
We have also constructed  additional  estimates using alternative 
rates of return.  Although we have based our six percent discount 
rate on an average  of rates of return  earned  during  the period 1861 
to 1909,25  we realize that a consideration  of other discount rates is 
useful. The estimates  in Table 9 show the sensitivity  of our results 
to discount  rates close to six (viz. five and seven) and also to a zero 
discount  rate. Our quantitative  results  are not much affected  by the 
first two, while the latter yields very high indirect costs for the 
South. 
A  FEW  IMPLICATIONS OF  THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT  COSTS OF 
THE  CIVIL  WAR 
The Cost of the War in Per Capita Terms 
One useful way of expressing  the cost of the Civil War is as the 
percentage of hypothetical consumption  per capita foregone be- 
cause of the war. The amount  of foregone per capita consumption 
and this value as a percent of hypothetical consumption,  1861 to 
1909, are given in Table 10. Because we have assumed that the 
25  See Table XV of "Notes." American Civil  War  319 
TABLE  9 
COST OF THE  CIVIL WAR USING ALTERNATIVE RATES OF  DISCOUNT 
(1860  $, billions) 
North  Southa 
r = .07b  r =.05  r = 0  r =  .07  r =  .05  r = 0 
Direct Cost  3.1599  3.6135  6.2337  3.1273  3.4748  5.4127 
Indirect CostC  4.8686  5.6309  8.9288  8.0736  11.3066  36.3019 
a  The  direct cost  estimate for the  South is  based  on  our adjusted Confederate 
expenditures. 
b  r =  rate at which costs are discounted. 
c  These costs are for all residents and include the foregone consumption of those 
killed. 
Sources: See text. 
North "caught up" by  1879, no costs are experienced by  Union 
citizens after that date. The South, however, did not experience 
this rapid catching up process, and foregone consumption  losses 
continue into the twentieth century. 
Those who remained  in the South  experienced  the greatest  losses. 
In fact as late as 1909 southerners  on average consumed roughly 
thirty percent less than had per capita consumption  continued to 
grow after 1860 at the antebellum  rate. These persistent losses in 
the South  are due to a variety  of causes  among  which we cannot  dis- 
tinguish at the present time. There were capital losses, general in- 
stability and commercial  stoppage.  The slow recovery  in the South 
TABLE  10 
PER CAPITA COST OF  THE  CIVIL WAR:  1861 TO  1909 
Total U.S.  North  South 
Year  1860 $a  % of P.C.C.b  1860 $  % of P.C.C.  1860 $  % of P.C.C. 
1861  8.41  6.9  4.99  3.7  12.09  13.8 
1862  13.46  10.9  11.43  8.4  22.81  25.7 
1863  19.58  15.7  15.29  11.1  32.32  35.9 
1864  25.34  20.1  19.50  14.0  40.78  44.8 
1865  30.81  24.1  24.21  17.1  48.34  52.4 
1869  26.71  19.9  18.56  12.6  48.67  50.1 
1874  19.33  14.3  9.61  6.5  46.21  47.1 
1879  12.60  8.3  0  0  48.46  43.9 
1884  12.95  7.8  0  0  50.77  42.5 
1889  12.30  7.6  0  0  47.15  41.1 
1894  10.66  6.9  0  0  42.71  39.7 
1899  12.15  6.5  0  0  48.66  38.3 
1904  12.93  6.4  0  0  52.31  36.8 
1909  14.01  6.3  0  0  57.39  35.3 
a This is a population weighted average of the costs for the North and the South. 
b  Percent of hypothetical per capita consumption. 
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may indeed have had much to do with Reconstruction,  and it is 
possible that emancipation  lowered measured  consumption  by pre- 
venting the exploitation  of scale economies.  As pointed out earlier, 
part of this cost could also be the result of ex-slaves'  lowering  their 
work effort in favor of increased  leisure and would not necessarily 
imply a decrease in well being. 
DID  THE  CIVIL  WAR  ACCELERATE  U.S.  OR  NORTHERN  GROWTH? 
Many  historians  interpret  the Civil War as a watershed  in Ameri- 
can history  because they believe it fundamentally  changed the U.S. 
economy to  one  receptive to  industrialization.  Two  well-known 
theses concerning the effects of the Civil War on the American 
economy are those of Charles  and Mary Beard and Louis Hacker. 
The Beards  view the termination  of the Civil War conflict  as begin- 
ning the "rise  of capitalism."  Through  a mechanism  which they never 
completely detail, the destruction  of agrarianism  with Confederate 
defeat "assured  the triumph  of business enterprise."  Hacker's  thesis 
is similar  to that of the Beards,  but the engine of industrialism  in his 
model is more precisely specified.  Northern  victory gave the indus- 
trialist-capitalist  class,  "the  instrumentalities  of political  power"  used 
to pass legislation which enabled "the triumph of American  capi- 
talism."26 
One interpretation  of the Beard-Hacker  thesis is that the Civil 
War enabled greater  growth rates than would have been achieved 
in the U.S. without the war. This implies that some of the costs of 
the war were offset by benefits  from industrialization.  Even though 
wartime destruction  reduced our capacity to produce consumption 
goods,  the war's  political  consequences  may have produced  a higher 
rate of growth of per capita consumption.  Therefore  it is possible 
that the war conferred  net benefits on either the whole U.S. or at 
least on the northern  sector. 
Many economists and historians have challenged these views, 
using data on industrialization  gathered  since the Beard  and Hacker 
volumes were written. They have, in general, found that the era 
following the Civil War was not a break  with the past in terms of 
economic activity. For example, Cochran reports that changes in 
value added for the period 1839  to 1859 are similar  to those for 1869 
to 1889,  and that the war had little lasting  impact  on the production 
26  Hacker, The Triumph of American Capitalism, p. 251. American Civil  War  321 
of pig iron,  bituminous  coal, and railroad  track.  Engerman  reiterates 
the Cochran  position with further data and shows that total com- 
modity output grew at 4.6 percent from 1840 to 1860 and at 4.4 
percent from 1870 to 1900. In addition, the shift toward manufac- 
turing after the war was merely a continuation  of changes already 
begun before the conflict.27  The Civil War  for these scholars  has not 
stood up to the test of being a watershed  era. 
Although  it now seems clear that the Civil War did not radically 
alter the path of American  industrialization,  the debate on the im- 
pact of the war still has not answered  the question of whether the 
war conferred  net gains on the North  or on the U.S. as a whole. We 
interpret  the Beards  and Hacker  to imply that many groups  in the 
U.S. benefited  on net from the Civil War, and we can partially  test 
this proposition  with our direct and indirect  cost estimates.28 
The direct cost statistic measures  all war costs except those due 
to political instability, possible postwar gains stemming directly 
from  the war, and so on. The indirect  estimate  captures  all costs and 
benefits,  for it measures  total consumption  foregone  due to the war. 
Therefore  the difference  between the two can be identified as any 
cost or benefit which was not included in the direct estimate. In 
particular,  the gains from industrialization,  a la  Hacker and the 
Beards,  would be contained  in this difference. 
The North experienced $3.37 billion in  direct costs and $5.23 
billion using the indirect method. Therefore,  $1.86 billion was not 
captured in the direct cost estimate. If the North experienced  an 
increase  in consumption  due to the war, it had to have been either 
very  minor  or  much overweighed  by unrecorded  war destruction  and 
costs.29 
27  See  Cochran, "Did  the  Civil  War Retard Industrialization?"  and  Engerman, 
"The Economic Impact of the Civil War," in Andreano, The Economic Impact of the 
American Civil War. 
28  Our reading of  the  Beards and  Hacker is  only one  of  several possible inter- 
pretations. For example, they could be implying that the distribution of income, not 
actual consumption, was changed. But even if  this is the  correct interpretation,  we 
can test the  proposition that the  North alone gained at the  expense of  the  South. 
In addition, although the  Beards and Hacker allow for "spillover" effects to  other 
sectors, they may be  saying that only northern capitalists gained at the  expense of 
labor. We have not attempted to test this proposition. See Engerman, "The Impact of 
the American Civil War," on this point. 
29  As noted above, this conclusion holds only if  we  assume that per capita con- 
sumption in the North would have continued to grow at close to, or above, the pre- 
war rate in the absence of a war. Using both alternative hypotheses (Case 3, Table 
8)  changes our results, and we get a $1.09 billion ($3.366-$2.271)  gross gain to the 322  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
The difference in the southern direct and indirect measures is 
even greater  and amounts  to a staggering  $4.23 billion. Included in 
this figure  are  costs due to the loss of scale economies  from  the use of 
slaves in agriculture,  capital destruction  which was not included in 
our estimate, and political instabilities  during the war and recon- 
struction  periods.30 
In conclusion,  we find no evidence that the Civil War benefited 
either the North or the whole U.S. even in a gross  way. On the con- 
trary,  the costs of the war were so wide-ranging  and persistent  that 
in spite of thorough  investigation  the direct measure  captures  only 
forty-two  percent of these costs for the entire United States.3' 
CLAUDIA  D.  GOLDIN,  Princeton  University 
FRANK D.  LEWIS, Queen's  University, Ontario 
North from the war. But since the indirect cost is  still positive this possible redis- 
tribution was outweighed by other costs resulting from the conflict. 
30  We have netted out losses due to a decline in freedman's work effort by sub- 
tracting our upper bound figure of $1.96 billion. 
31  $6.66 billion has been  accounted for in  our direct cost estimate although the 
indirect estimate yields  ($14.70  -  $1.96 =  $12.74).  We  subtract from the  indirect 
measure our estimate for the cost of greater leisure time in the post-bellum South. American Civil  War  323 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX  TABiL  11 
POPULATION  STATISTICS  FOR  SOUTH  AND  NORTH,  1861  TO  1910 
(Thousands) 
(4)  (5)  (6) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  "Native"  "Native"  "Native" 
Population  Population  Population  Population  Population  Population 
Year  U.S.  Non-South  South  U.S.  Non-South  South 
1861  32351  23394.8  8956.2  32351  23394.8  8956.2 
1862  33188  24025.8  9162.2  33096  23933.8  9162.2 
1863  34026  24658.8  9367.2  33756  24388.8  9367.2 
1864  34863  25292.4  9570.6  34394  24823.4  9570.6 
1865  35701  25927.9  9773.1  34976  25202.9  9773.1 
1869  39051  28480.9  10570.1  37187  26616.9  10570.1 
1874  44040  32346.9  11693.1  41096  29048.4  12047.6 
1879  49208  36410.2  12797.8  44993  31394.7  13598.3 
1884  55379  41247.5  14131.5  49014  33935.7  15078.3 
1889  61775  46303.0  15472.0  52919  36350.7  16568.3 
1894  68275  51234.2  17040.8  57308  38901.8  18406.2 
1899  74799  56123.2  18675.8  61515  41253.1  20261.9 
1904  82165  61854.0  20311.0  65541  43472.0  22069.0 
1909  90492  68403.4  22088.6  70015  45920.1  24094.9 
1860  31433.3  22706.7  8726.6 
1870  39818.4  29071.0  10747.4 
1880  50155.8  37165.6  12990.2 
1890  62947.7  47241.0  15706.7 
1900  75994.6  57018.9  18975.7 
1910  91972.3  69579.1  22393.2 
Notes:  Column (1):  Historical Statistics, p.  7  and 8.  Columns (2)  and  (3):  A 
Federal Census undernumeration  of  the  1870  southern population data is 
partially rectified in Historical Statistics, p.  8.  Although this gives the re- 
estimated total U.S. population figure, this adjustment is  not incorporated 
in the state totals, (p.  13).  Our 1870 southern population is computed by 
subtracting  the 1870 non-South population from the reestimated total popu- 
lation. Column (4):  The total U.S. native population is computed by sub- 
tracting the  net  number of  immigrants who  entered after 1861  from the 
total population. The children of these immigrants  are also subtracted using 
the assumption that the natural rate of increase of immigrants was equal to 
that for natives. Columns (5)  and (6):  It is assumed that all immigrants 
who entered from 1861 to  1869 went to  the  North. For the  period after 
1869, the ratio of the rate of increase of the native population in the South 
to the corresponding  rate in the North is assumed to equal the ratio of the 
natural rate of increase in the South to that in the North. See Table XV of 
"Notes." 
Sources: Historical Statistics, p. 7, 8,  12 and 13. Hope T. Eldridge and Dorothy S. 
Thomas, Demographic Analyses and  Interrelations, Population Redistribu- 
tion and Economic Growth: United States, 1870-1950, Vol. III  (Philadel- 
phia: American Philosophical Society, 1964),  p. 33.  See also Table XV of 
"Notes" for rates of natural increase in the North and South. 324  C. Goldin; F.  Lewis 
APPENDIX  TABLE  12 
ACTUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTIONa 
(1860  $) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Year  U.S.  Non-South  South 
1860  120.53  133.60  86.51 
1861  115.01  130.12  75.54 
1862  109.96  126.74  65.96 
1863  105.31  123.44  57.60 
1864  101.03  120.23  50.30 
1865  97.07  117.10  43.92 
1869  107.37  129.23  48.47 
1874  115.51  138.49  51.95 
1879  138.47  165.34  62.02 
1884  153.02  181.93  68.63 
1889  150.16  178.45  67.44 
1894  144.01  170.37  64.76 
1899  174.09  205.93  78.40 
1904  188.73  221.23  89.76 
1909  209.36  243.01  105.15 
a Per capita consumption  in the North and South for the periods 1839 to 1859 and 
1869 to 1909 is derived from Gallman's  national income figures and from Easterlin's 
regional income estimates. An adjustment is made to the Easterlin estimate to allow 
for the difference between the states comprising the South and those in the Confed- 
eracy. Eldridge and Thomas in Population Redistribution give state per capital con- 
sumption values for 1880, 1900, and 1920.  (The  District of Columbia, not included 
in these data, is assigned the Delaware estimate.) Intermediate year values are based 
on the assumption that the ratio of per capita consumption in the  South to that in 
the U.S. changed at a constant rate. For the period 1839 to 1859, it is assumed that 
the southern states which did not secede had the same average per capita consump- 
tion as those that did. The 1860 values are based on the assumption  that each region 
grew at the same rate from 1859 to 1860 as it did from 1839 to 1859. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that each grew at its 1869 to  1879 rate between 1865 and 1869. For 
the period 1860 to  1865 we  assume that per capita consumption fell  at a  constant 
rate in each region. 
Sources: R. Easterlin, "Regional Income Trends," reprinted in Fogel and Engerman, 
The  Reinterpretation  of  American Economic History, pp.  39-40;  Eldridge 
and Thomas, Population Redistribution,  Vol. 1, p. 753; Historical Statistics, 
pp.  12  and  13;  Gallman, unpublished national income  estimates  (June 
1965);  Engerman, "Economic Impact of the Civil War," reprinted in Fogel 
and Engerman, The Reinterpretation  of American Economic History, p. 372. American Civil  War  325 
APPENDIX  TABLE  13 
HYPOTHETICAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
(1860  $) 
Year  U.S.  Non-Southa  Southb 
1861  121.97  135.11  87.63 
1862  123.42  136.63  88.77 
1863  124.89  138.17  89.92 
1864  126.37  139.73  91.08 
1865  127.88  141.31  92.26 
1869  134.08  147.79  97.14 
1874  134.84  148.10  98.16 
1879  151.07  165.34  110.48 
1884  165.97  181.93  119.40 
1889  162.46  178.45  114.59 
1894  154.67  170.37  107.47 
1899  186.24  205.93  127.06 
1904  201.66  221.23  142.07 
1909  223.37  243.01  162.54 
a  Hypothetical per capita consumption in the non-South is assumed to grow at a 
constant rate from 1860 to the actual 1879 figure, with the following adjustment for 
deviations from trend values between 1869 and 1879. Let: 
Cai(h)  =  actual  (hypothetical)  per capita consumption in  year i 
ra(h)  =  trend rate of growth of actual (hypothetical) per capita consumption 
Setting i =  0 in the base year, we adjust for deviations from trend by assuming: 
Ca t  Ch t 
Ca0(1  +  ra)t  ChO(l  +  rh)t 
Actual and hypothetical per capita consumption  are identical after 1879. 
b  Hypothetical per capita consumption  in the South is assumed to grow at the 1839 
to  1859  rate, with  the  above  adjustment for  deviations from trend values in  the 
periods 1869 to 1879 and 1879 to 1909. The period 1869 to 1909 is divided into two 
parts because the acceleration in the rate of  growth which occurred between  1869 
and 1879 is assumed to have been a result of the war. Therefore, our hypothetical 
growth path is not constructed to exhibit this deviation from the 1869 to 1909 trend 
rate of growth. 
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APPENDIX  TABLE  14 
ACTUAL AND  HYPOTHETICAL  PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
UNDER  ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONSa 
(1860  $) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
North  South 
Year  Actual  Hypothetical  Actual  Hypothetical 
1861  133.11  134.94  81.12  87.38 
1862  132.62  136.29  76.06  88.25 
1863  132.13  137.65  71.32  89.13 
1864  131.64  139.02  66.87  90.02 
1865  131.15  140.41  62.70  90.92 
1869  129.23  146.12  48.47  94.61 
1874  138.49  145.50  51.95  89.64 
1879  165.34  161.40  62.02  104.51 
1884  181.93  177.59  68.63  112.95 
1889  178.45  174.20  67.44  108.40 
1894  170.37  166.31  64.76  101.66 
1899  205.93  201.02  78.40  120.19 
1904  221.23  215.96  89.76  134.39 
1909  243.01  237.22  105.15  153.76 
a We have computed the indirect cost of the war using both an alternative hypo- 
thetical consumption stream and an alternative "actual" consumption stream to  test 
the sensitivity of our initial results. The latter change applies to the period 1861 to 
1869 for which data on consumption are not available. Although the "actual" con- 
sumption stream which  we  use  for 1861 to  1869  (see  Table  12)  seems the  most 
reasonable to us, we  have tested the sensitivity of our results by assuming that per 
capita consumption declined at a constant rate throughout the Civil War decade. We 
assume in the new hypothetical case that per capita consumption would have grown 
from 1861 to 1879 at only 1 percent per year. After 1879, we apply the same rate of 
growth exhibited by the hypothetical consumption stream in Table 13. 
Source: See above. 